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Summary
The paper uses unique data on contracts concluded by providers of home care to evaluate the
effect of provider market power on prices of home care services in the Netherlands. Since, at
least in some regions, one or two providers dominate the market, there are concerns about the
effect of providers’ market power on the pricing of home care services. Using data on contracted
prices and quantities for 2004–2006, we find that providers with a larger market share are able to
contract at a higher price. The effect remains after controlling for quality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Worldwide ageing societies and the increase in chronic illnesses are leading
to a growing demand for long-term care, which puts long-term care on the
list of priorities that need to be addressed by public policies (WHO 2003).
Since the beginning of the new century, the cost of long-term care have bal-
looned in all European countries and is projected to grow exponentially in
the future. These trends cause concerns about the affordability and sustain-
ability of the whole system of service provision (WHO 2008) and call for
finding more efficient ways of organizing and delivering long-term care.
Traditionally, public policies in this field have been focused on institu-
tional (‘residential’) care at nursing homes, as these were the main suppliers
of these services. However, lately there has been a substantial increase in the
use of long-term care delivered in the home care setting. The two primary
features of home care services are: first, the individual remains in his home
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setting and is not institutionalized; second, care can be also given by family
members and/or relatives. Important advantages of this type of care, espe-
cially for elderly individuals, are that this maintains independence and pre-
vents deterioration into ill health. From a social point of view, the substitu-
tion of home care for residential care has the additional advantage that costs
are often lower.
The process of substitution of home care for residential care coincides
with market-based health care reforms in many countries. These institutional
changes unveil new policy issues concerning the effectiveness of market mech-
anisms in different segments of health care, which represent challenges both
for policymakers and academic researchers. One of the market mechanisms
introduced by the reforms in different segments of health care is selective
contracting. The empirical literature on this topic is very small (see Section 2)
and has been mainly centered around hospital care. However, the grow-
ing importance of long term-care, particularly home care, leads to the need
of extending this research to this segment, which is organized and financed
rather differently from hospital care (see Section 3).
This paper complements the existing literature by providing new insights
about potential effects of selective contracting in the home care setting and
related policy issues. The focus is on the Dutch home care market. The Neth-
erlands is an interesting case to analyze given that this country is undergoing
a large scale reform in its health care policy resulting in a new demand-driven
and market-oriented health care delivery system. The reform of the long-term
care industry in the Netherlands has begun with a change of legislation in
2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expense Act (EMEA) that allowed
for more competition among suppliers of home care services. More precisely,
the new law made it possible for the 32 regional health care purchasing agen-
cies spread in the country to contract suppliers selectively and negotiate over
prices and quality. Selective contracting could create incentives for provid-
ers to offer better services. Thus, the new law created something akin to the
internal market in the British National Health Service in the 1990s.
Although the change in legislation was meant to create incentives to nego-
tiate home care services at lower prices, it only achieved a minor improve-
ment compared to the previous situation. The outcome of negotiations is
often at the regulatory maximum price or very close to it (about 30% of our
sample), and there are large prices differences across providers. In this paper
we analyze two major factors that may explain these price differences: pro-
vider market power and quality.
Market power is a serious concern in the home care market. At least
in some regions, one or two large providers dominate the regional mar-
ket and there is ongoing concentration among providers in other regions.
Large providers may be able to exercise market power in negotiation with the
purchasing agencies responsible for contracting care, which produces a pos-
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itive relationship between market share and the resulting price. However, a
high market share and a high price can both be the result of high quality.
It may be purchasing agencies use their bargaining power to induce higher
quality rather than to lower the price (competition on quality). Therefore, we
include quality in the regressions to control for this effect. The result that
market share increases price is robust to the inclusion of quality.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we will review the liter-
ature on market structure and health care market. We will then explain the
Dutch institutional setting and market set-up in the provision of home care
services (Section 3). Next, we describe the data and the trends in the develop-
ment of this sector (Section 4), after which we turn to the empirical analysis
(Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The empirical literature that studies the effect of selective contracting on pric-
ing by health care providers is very small and consists mainly of studies on
the US. These studies focus primarily on the effect of market indicators (the
number of firms or concentration indices) and firm-related indicators (own-
ership structure and market share) on prices in contracts concluded between
insurers and hospitals. These papers test the hypothesis that market players
with relatively stronger market position (i.e. more market power) obtain bet-
ter deals. More precisely: they test the hypotheses that a larger market share,
or less competition, or both these factors lead to a more favorable price for
the firm.1
The empirical results mostly confirm the hypothesis that a lower degree
of market competitiveness (e.g. higher concentration) creates a price advan-
tage for firms in this market. However, it appears that larger market share
does not always enable the firm to exercise market power (Staten et al. 1987,
1988). Staten et al. (1988) evaluated the effects of the market structure of the
hospital market and insurer market share on the discounts offered by hospi-
tals to gain acceptance into the Blue Cross PPO in Indiana and found that
the discount was positively related to the number of competing hospitals (as
one would expect), but negatively related to the Blue Cross share of hospital
revenue. Since the analysis of Staten focused on the period when Blue Cross
just made the transition into a PPO plan, Melnick et al. (1992) attributed the
1 In particular, more market power of an insurer leads to a larger discount, and more mar-
ket power of a provider leads to a higher price for its health care services. The upward effect
of provider market power on prices is stressed also in the theoretical literature. Gal-Or (1999)
argues that the desire to strengthen bargaining power may be also an important driving factor
behind the on-going integration of physician and hospitals.
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second result to the relative inexperience with selective contracting of the
newly formed Blue Cross Indiana PPO.
Bamezai et al. (2003), who used a probit model to analyze the contract-
ing data of California’s Medicaid program (Medi-Cal), found no evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that a large payer (the insurer) was better able to
exercise market power, while they found a significant effect of the number of
competitors in the hospital market. In particular, hospitals with fewer com-
petitors had greater bargaining power vis-a`-vis Medi-Cal and were less likely
to negotiate a contract.
Brooks et al. (1997) support the hypothesis that a larger size enables an
insurer to get better deals from hospitals, but not the hypothesis that a larger
size of a hospital enables it to get better deals from insurers. In particular,
contrary to Staten et al. (1988), this paper found that insurers with a greater
presence in the market have a greater bargaining power. On the hospital side,
however, a marginally significant negative relationship between the size of the
hospital and hospital bargaining power was found. The authors derive their
empirical model from a theoretical bargaining model of Svejnar (1986) and
estimate it by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).2 The estimate of the hospi-
tal bargaining power parameter reveals that hospitals have relatively more
bargaining power than insurers. Additionally, greater hospital concentration
improves the bargaining position of the hospital; and a greater enrolment of
the population in HMOs has a positive impact on hospital bargaining power
with respect to fee-for-service plans.
Significant effects of many market structure indicators have been found in
the study of Melnick et al. (1992), which results lend support to the hypothe-
ses expressed above. The authors investigate prices obtained in different types
of markets by the largest PPO in California. They show that greater hospital
competition leads to lower prices. Furthermore, as the importance of a hospi-
tal to the PPO in an area increases, the price rises substantially. Another sig-
nificant result is that the higher the percentage a hospital’s total patient days
accounted for by Blue Cross, the greater the leverage Blue Cross has with
the hospital. Per-diem prices negotiated between Blue Cross of California and
providers are used to examine the effect of market structure on PPO prices
and regressed using two-stage least squares (2SLS) on a vector of covari-
ates, including both market and provider characteristics. The estimated coeffi-
cient for the HHI, that varies between 0.11 and 0.13 and is highly significant,
shows that, after controlling for product differences, Blue Cross pays higher
prices to hospitals located in less competitive markets. The authors also test
alternative methods to define hospital geographic markets and reveal that the
2 Given the censored nature of the dependent variable in this study, Halbersma et al. (2007)
suggest that using a more advanced estimation procedure for censored data would increase the
consistency of estimates.
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common practice of using counties to define the market leads to an underes-
timation of the price-increasing effects of a merger.
Although the literature generally confirms that market circumstances affect
the outcome of contracting, it also shows that the relative importance (signif-
icance) of these factors may differ across markets. In particular, the effect of
market share on prices varies and may be highly sensitive to the institutional
setting. Note also that most of the literature concerns the hospital industry.
With the penetration of selective contracting practices in other segments of
health care, such as nursing care and home care, the same question needs to
be answered also for these new markets.
3 HOME CARE IN THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch Exceptional Medical Expense Act (EMEA) came into force in
the Netherlands in 1968. This insurance scheme covers the whole population
for long-term care, mental illness requiring prolonged nursing and care, and
congenital physical or mental handicap. The target group for services pro-
vided under the Act has expanded a great deal and has become much more
diverse over the past few years; it presently mainly comprises elderly peo-
ple, the disabled and mentally ill patients with chronic problems. Each indi-
vidual is automatically insured for EMEA services; contribution depends on
income and is levied by the tax authorities. EMEA services also demand out-
of-pocket outlays of the user, which can be quite substantial.
3.1 Organization of the Home Care Provision Under EMEA
The EMEA insurance delivers both residential (inpatient) services and home
(outpatient) services. The main differences between residential and home care
are the following:
• Residential services are delivered inside a medical institution, such as a
nursing home, psychiatric clinic, etc. Residential care involves more invest-
ment (e.g. in the infrastructure), it needs an extra license for expanding
the range of services, economies of scale are likely to arise, and only non-
profit institutions deliver care.
• Home care relates to all services provided to patients living outside a
medical institution. It does not involve a specific investment in expen-
sive infrastructure, an expansion of a service (function of care)3 can be
arranged quicker and easier than residential care because there is no need
3 The products that are included in our dataset can be allocated into the following func-
tions of care: house care, personal care, nursing, general supervision, activating supervision,
and treatments. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a brief description of the above-mentioned
functions of care.
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for an extra license, there is a high concentration of firms in the market,
and since January 2006 for-profit firms are allowed to enter the market.4
We focus on home care. There are currently 800,000 people in the Nether-
lands eligible for these services. A special institution5 assesses the amount of
home care needed by each of these individuals. In each region of the Nether-
lands, a single purchasing agency is in charge of buying the necessary amount
of home care for this region.6 These agencies thus act as monopsonists in
the region. They are responsible for contracting care to satisfy the needs of
the region. By means of their purchasing and contracting policies, purchas-
ing agencies effectively set the amount and quality of the care contracted.7
Figure 1 presents the division of the Netherlands in 32 home care regions.
Providers of home care must have a legal permit to supply their services.8
Home care providers bargain with purchasing agencies over the amounts and
the prices of care to be delivered. Contracts are negotiated on a yearly basis.
Negotiations take place with the purchasing agency of the region in which
the supplier is officially registered. In the last few years the Dutch home care
sector experienced several changes, which aimed to introduce market compe-
tition elements into the system. In particular, Dutch purchasing agencies have
been allowed to contract providers selectively and to set different require-
ments for different suppliers (CTG/ZAio and CTZ 2005).9
4 See NZa (2006).
5 This Institution is called in Dutch Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg, CIZ.
6 It is also possible for suppliers to provide services to clients residing outside the purchas-
ing agency’s own region. If 35% or more of all clients of a supplier come from a different
region than the one where the supplier is officially registered, the purchasing offices of the
concerned regions are jointly responsible for contracting such a provider, and they consult
with each other about the financing of care. If 85% or more of all clients of a supplier come
from another region, purchasing agencies can decide to delegate negotiations with the supplier
to the purchasing agency of the region where the majority of its clients is situated (CTG/ZAio
and CTZ 2005).
7 Purchasing agencies must inquire the clients’ experiences concerning the health services they
received. Therefore they observe at least some dimensions of quality and thus can use this
information when selecting among regional providers.
There are more arrangements safeguarding the level of quality of home care in the Nether-
lands. A specific law on quality makes the provider of EMEA services responsible for their
own quality levels (ICM 2005). The Inspectorate for Health care (IGZ) checks whether each
supplier complies with the minimum quality requirements set by law.
8 This permission is released by the Centraal Informatiepunt Beroepen Gezondheidszorg, CIBG.
9 The other notable changes are providing the possibility for clients to opt for a personal
budget with which to buy care, defining functions of care to tailor consumers’ demands, and
enabling providers to defray their costs based on these functions. Moreover, in 2007 the func-
tion ‘house care’ (see Appendix 1) has been transferred to the municipalities.
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Figure 1 – EMEA regions in the Netherlands, Source: Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (2006)
3.2 Funding
Funding of EMEA services consists of two parts: (i) purchasing agencies are
reimbursed for the care services delivered by their contracted providers; (ii)
they receive a fixed budget set by the Ministry to cover their own operation
cost. Typically, the health insurance company with the highest market share
in a region performs the role of the purchasing agency in that region.10 The
insurer is not at risk for the cost of home care delivered by contracted pro-
viders. Instead, these costs are paid out of a special fund for EMEA ser-
vices, which is filled by premiums paid by the employed and all tax payers
who have income from labor or home ownership.11 Insurers are only at risk
with respect to the second part of the funding—the operation cost, since the
insurer bears any excesses or shortfalls between actual operation costs and
the budget. This structure creates an incentive for an insurance company to
control the operation costs of its purchasing agency (NMa 2004).
Until 2004, there were no restrictions on the total budget of each health
care purchasing agency. Therefore, the volume of care they could contract in
those years was unrestricted. However, since 2004, the budget room available
for contracting has been capped, restricting in turn also the total volume of
care that could be contracted. This produced a change in incentives of health
purchasing agencies, affecting both quantities and prices.
10 Some insurance companies have a high market share in more than one region. These
companies have therefore control of purchasing agencies in different regions.
11 This budget is called Algemene Fonds Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AFBZ.
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The social responsibility of purchasing agencies should stimulate them to
act in the best interests of consumers. The budgetary caps make them more
aware of health care costs, which should create incentive to select better pro-
viders and achieve better deals. Yet, the incentive to reduce the price of con-
tracted care is weakened to the extent that more intensive bargaining with
suppliers over prices of services involves higher operation costs. The pres-
sure to fulfill their contracting obligations at lower operation costs creates the
incentive to select larger providers. Besides, the agency would always strive
for concluding contracts with all the major regional providers because failing
to conclude a contract with such providers would cast a negative image on
the agency and the insurer (NZa 2007), affecting the insurer’s position in the
market for health insurance. Therefore, health care providers know they will
get a deal with the purchasing agency and have thus no incentives to reduce
the price.
4 DATA
The dataset used in this paper contains data on contracted prices and quan-
tities of home care services in the Netherlands and covers the period 2004–
2006.12 It contains data on 1,403 service providers. There exist in total 121
different services, however, a particular provider typically provides fewer ser-
vices. There are 32 regional health care purchasing agencies. The contracted
prices and quantities result from negotiation between providers and purchas-
ing agencies, in which each provider negotiates its tariffs and quantities with
only one such agency. Contracted prices cannot exceed maximum tariffs, set
by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) at the national level. The maxi-
mum tariff for each product is also included in our dataset.
Home care services can be divided into two large segments, to which we
refer as H and F in accordance with their official coding by the NZa.13 The
H-segment includes what we call ‘home care’: house cleaning and personal
care, supporting and activating supervision, and nursing. The F-segment cov-
ers products that relate to mental health. Table 1 compares the contracted
prices and the regulatory maximum tariffs. Although there is a small down-
ward trend in the ratio of contracted prices to regulated prices as well as
a decline in the share of observations featuring maximum prices, there are
still about 30% of such observations. The average contracted price is 6%
12 This excludes unreliable observations (those with missing and negative values as well as
the observations for one product where the data were not expressed in the same units for each
years). The data were also available for 2003, however, data on 2003 are not fully consistent
with the rest of the sample, therefore we could not use them.
13 The coding of products is in accordance with Circular CA-92.
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TABLE 1 – COMPARISON OF CONTRACTED PRICES TO REGULATED MAXIMUM
TARIFFS
2004 2005 2006
Contracted prices as a percentage of regulated maximum tariffs (means with
standard deviations in brackets)
H-segment 97% (7) 95% (8) 95% (7)
F-segment 90% (6) 89% (6) 89% (5)
Overall 95% (8) 94% (8) 94% (7)
Percentage of observations with contracted prices equal to maximum tariffs
H-segment 71% 38% 34%
F-segment 10% 7% 2%
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Figure 2 – Relation between market share and relative price (relative price is defined as the
ratio of contracted price to regulated maximum tariff)
below the maximum, the standard deviation being 7%. Figure 2, reflecting the
relation between market share and the level of price, reveals more detail on
price differences across providers in both segments. We observe that in the
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H-segment, contracted prices of large providers are close to the regulatory
maximum price.14
Since with just a few exceptions, providers normally specialize in delivering
either H- or F-products, it is possible to analyze the H-segment (conventional
home care) separately from the other segment. The analysis of the F-seg-
ment would be more problematic, because there the service area of a pro-
vider often overlaps with other regions. Providers operating in the F-segment
often deliver services to more than one region, causing problems in defining
regional markets (PWC 2005). Therefore, in the next section, we focus purely
on the H-segment and include only providers from this segment, thus exclud-
ing providers that traditionally specialize on services to patients with mental
illness or congenital physical or mental handicap.
5 ESTIMATION
In line with other empirical papers that focus on the effect of the market
structure on price (discussed in Section 2), we assume that the prices of
each provider depend on structural characteristics (provider market share and
market concentration), other provider characteristics, and characteristics of
the regional agency. We define these variables as follows.
Provider market share, s, is the share of its contracted production volumes
(weighted by regulated maximum tariffs) in the total production volumes
contracted by the regional agency. The use of contracted volumes, instead
of realized volumes, allows us to avoid endogeneity. Since providers cannot
adjust their production capacity (personnel) in the short run, the volumes
offered for contracting are actually fixed in advance, so that the negotiation
goes on price, rather than on quantity.
The degree of market concentration is expressed by the regional Hirsch-
man-Herfindahl Index, HHI, defined for each region as H H I =∑ s2i , where
i runs over the set of all regional providers. The provider market share si
characterizes the relative market position of the provider, and HHI relates to
market conditions in general.
14 The fact that prices in this segment lie closer to the regulated values than those in the
F-segment allows for different interpretations. It is likely that the regulator has better insight
in the cost level in the H-segment than in the F-segment. In fact, the regulator uses the results
of benchmarking analyses to set maximum prices in the H-segment, while such analyses are
not available for the F-segment. However, the discrepancy may also arise for other reasons
(e.g. related to quality). Additionally, as from January 1st, 2007 the function of ‘house care’
has passed under the jurisprudence of a new law (WMO, Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteu-
ning). This change brought uncertainty to health care providers because it was not explicit
what would happen with their financial reserves. This might have influenced the contract rela-
tionship in 2006 between health care providers and purchasing agencies, namely purchasing
agencies collaborated in fixing relatively high prices in order to avoid financial distress of pro-
viders in 2007.





















Figure 3 – Number of functions and market share, 2004–2006
An important provider characteristic that we include is the number of
functions, N, performed by the provider. When defining the functions, we
apply the same classification of allocation as used by the regulator (see
Appendix 1). We expect the effect of this variable on price to be positive.
First, agencies may prefer providers with a broader function range as these
providers can combine services and serve also clients with broad range of
needs. Second, if it is relatively more expensive to deliver services to clients
who need a broader range of care, then providers with more functions should
also demand a higher price. As can be seen from Figure 3, all large providers
have at least four functions, while there are small providers with any number
of functions.
Finally, we include regional dummies in order to control for the differ-
ences across regional agencies (on which we do not have much information),
as well as year dummies.
Next to differences across regions, there may be also differences across
providers within the same region. First, provider costs may differ due to
differences in travel costs to reach clients (e.g., higher travel costs in rural
areas where clients may be more disperse). Second, informal care and nursing
homes represent alternatives to home care for some patients and may affect
market conditions within regional markets. In order to explicitly account for
these effects one would need to know the information on providers’ locations
within regions, which is not available to us. Note, however, that we do not
have reasons to believe that there are systematic differences in these factors
in favor of small providers, i.e., that on average small providers face more
favorable market conditions or lower travel costs than large companies. Hence,
we do not explicitly control for these factors in our regression.
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This leads to the followings specification of the empirical model:





βyear Dyear + ε (1)
The dependent variable p, reflecting the price level of the provider, is defined
as a ‘normalized price’: the ratio of the revenue contracted by the provider
(equal to the sum of contracted volumes multiplied by contracted prices) to
its potential maximum revenue (equal to the sum of contracted volumes mul-
tiplied by regulatory maximum tariffs).
Since contracted prices are restricted by the regulated maximum tariffs, the
dependent variable is restricted by 1. OLS estimates would be biased in this
case; therefore, we choose to use Tobit estimates for censored data.15
5.1 Estimation of the Effect of Market Share
Table 2 shows estimation results both including and excluding the variable
‘number of functions’ (see regressions 1 and 2). The results are in line with
what we expected. They support the presence of a positive relationship between
market share and price. The positive and highly significant coefficient for
market share indicates that the price is an increasing function of market share
in the relevant range.
The coefficient 0.134 in Regression 1 means that a market share increase
of 1% translates into an increase of the relative price of 0.134%. Table 3 illus-
trates the potential price differences as the result of the differences in market
share, based on the results of our estimates in Table 2. According to these
estimates large providers who serve half of the regional market are able to
charge about 4% more than small providers (where not restricted by the reg-
ulated maximum tariffs).
In contrast to most studies reviewed in Section 2, the effect of HHI appears
to be small and insignificant. This result holds even if we re-estimate the rela-
tionship excluding regional dummies or excluding market share s (not shown
here). Since the effect of HHI is insignificant and moreover has a negative
15 The standard Tobit regression assumes that the observations are independent. However,
we have more than one observation on each provider in our dataset. Since such observations
are not independent, we need to take care of this when estimating the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimators. To do so, we used the cluster option of the intreg-estimator pro-
vided in Stata. The intreg-command obtains the same coefficients as a Tobit regression, but
improves the robustness of the standard errors. The cluster option specifies that the standard
errors allow for intragroup correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the observations
are independent. We clustered by provider so to specify that the observations are indepen-
dent across groups but dependent within groups. The same approach has been used, e.g., by
Burr et al. (2005).
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TABLE 2 – TOBIT-ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL CHARACTERIS-
TICS ON RELATIVE PRICE, 2004–2006














S 0.134*** 0.085*** 0.062** 0.055***
HHI −0.028 −0.013 −0.014
Number of functions 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
Quality 0.015 0.032
Missing quality dummy 0.090 0.238
Year2 −0.043*** −0.044*** −0.044***
Year3 −0.043*** −0.044*** −0.044***
Const 0.981*** 0.949*** 0.808*** 0.711***
Number of observations 2497 2497 843 2497
Number of censored
observations
517 517 99 517
LL 1952 1986 823 1990
Chi2 387.4 399.4 185.3 411.3
Chi2 (regional dummies)a154.2 149.8 127.4 155.5
Note: *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.
a Regional dummies were also included in regressions. Here we do not report the
respective coefficients in order to safe space. Chi2 (regional dummies) corresponds
to the test for their joint significance.
TABLE 3 – PRICE INCREASE AS THE RESULT OF CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE
Point increase in market share (%) 5 25 45 65
Resulting price increase (regression 1) (%) 0.7 3.4 6.0 8.7
Resulting price increase after correction for 0.4 2.1 3.8 5.5
complexity (regression 2) (%)
sign, it is unlikely that the concentration itself is the reason for relatively high
prices in some regions. Omitting HHI from the model (not shown here) does
not produce much change to the other coefficients and their t-statistics.16
As expected, the effect of the number of functions on price is positive
and significant. We also find significant differences in contracted prices for
16 The correlation between market share s and HHI is 0.14.
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some health care purchasing agencies. To the extent that market share picks
up market power, this must reflect other factors than relative bargaining
strength. The negative coefficients for the year-dummies indicate that relative
contracted prices (as compared to maximum tariffs) decreased.
We have performed a number of specification tests for our model (Haus-
man test and the link test.)17 These tests accept our specification form. Also
the proportion of censored data in the initial sample has appeared to be close
to the proportion of censored data as predicted by the model.
5.2 Controlling for Quality
Although we find a positive relationship between price and market share (and
insignificant relationship with HHI), we cannot rule out that both differences
in price and differences in market share are caused by differences in quality.
For example, suppose health care purchasing agencies prefer to contract sup-
pliers with high quality, and suppose also that it is costly to produce higher
quality. Then this will result in a positive relationship between price and mar-
ket share even if firms with high market share have no market power.
In order to further investigate this possibility we need to control for qual-
ity in our estimations. However, quality data are not available for the com-
plete sample, but for a smaller sample of providers. Therefore, we can con-
trol for quality differences for this restricted sample of providers. This will
allow us to check for sensitivity of the estimates obtained in regression 2 (see
Table 2) to the inclusion of quality. Besides, it may give us some insights
into the relationship between quality and prices, if the coefficient for quality
appears significant.
In 2005, an independent research bureau conducted a survey among 55,000
clients of 82 Dutch home care providers. The participants of the survey were
asked to evaluate their care providers on different aspects of quality on a
scale from 0 to 10. These evaluations were then aggregated to determine an
integral quality score for each provider.18 Figure 4 shows a scatter of the
available observations on quality and respective regional market shares of
home care providers in 2005. The discrepancy in the quality scores is not very
large. The correlation coefficient between market share and quality is −0.40,
and highly significant (p = 0.0034), casting doubts on the argument about a
superior quality of larger providers (at least for this sample).
Table 2 (regressions 3 and 4) shows the results of regressions that con-
trol for quality differences. Both regressions include two variables to control
17 The former tests that the probit part and the truncated regression part have the same
normalized coefficients, as implicitly assumed by Tobit; and the latter test checks the potential
misspecification of the functional form of the model (Pregibon 1980).
18 These data are currently publicly available on the website http://www.kiesbeter.nl.

















Figure 4 – Quality and market share (smaller sample, year 2005)
for quality: ‘quality’ (this is equal to the quality score if information is avail-
able, and 0 otherwise) and ‘missing quality dummy’ (equal to 1 if quality data
is not available, and 0 otherwise). Furthermore, since quality data are avail-
able only for 2005, we first report the results including this year only (regres-
sion 3), then the results (regression 4) for the period 2004–2006, based on
the assumption that quality (or strictly speaking quality differences) does not
change over time.
The findings indicate that the relationship between market share and price
remains after controlling for quality. The coefficient for quality is positive,
but insignificant. This precludes firm statements about the effect of quality
on prices.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper evaluates the effect of market share on contracted prices of
regional providers of home care in the Netherlands and explains the observed
price differences across providers. We focus on two alternative explanations
for these differences: provider market power and differences in quality. Both
explanations are plausible: on the one hand, large providers may be able to
exploit market power by raising prices above competitive levels; on the other
hand, price differences across providers may be driven by quality, if health
care purchasing agencies are willing to pay for better quality.
Our econometric analysis shows that, indeed, a larger market share is asso-
ciated with a higher price. This supports the conjecture about higher mar-
ket power of large home care providers. Note that this interpretation remains
valid even if bigger firms would have higher costs (on which we do not have
data), because in a competitive market, only firms of optimal scale would
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remain active. If large, high-cost firms are able to pass on their costs in
prices, then (ceteris paribus) this is evidence of market power.
As said, there could have been a second explanation for this finding that
is unrelated to market power. Suppose larger providers deliver higher qual-
ity. If purchasing agencies prefer to contract high quality providers, and if it
is more costly to produce high quality, then this would also produce a posi-
tive correlation between market shares and price. Unfortunately, quality data
are not available for the whole sample. Therefore, we can only check our
hypothesis for a smaller sample. The findings indicate that the relationship
between market share and price remains after controlling for quality. This
suggests that market power, rather than quality, explains the observed price
differences in home care.
How could policy measures countervail this market power? To answer this
question, let us first discuss what makes large providers be so strong negotia-
tors. As we explained in Section 3, health care purchasing agencies must ful-
fill strict obligations with respect to the amount of care contracted for cov-
ering the region’s demand. However, they lack financial incentives to buy
this care efficiently since they do not bear any financial risk on the price
of care they purchase from providers, while they do carry full financial risk
on the operational cost of contracting and negotiating. This may be a rea-
son why they prefer to deal with a limited number of larger suppliers rather
than with numerous small suppliers so that their transaction costs are kept
down and their operation cost budget is not fully exploited. Another factor
weakening the negotiation position of the purchasing agency vis-a`-vis large
providers is that not concluding a contract with these providers would cast a
negative image on the agency represented by an insurer, presumably affecting
the insurer’s position in the market for health insurance. Therefore, health
care providers know they will get a deal with the purchasing agency and have
thus no incentives to reduce the price.
From a policy viewpoint there are two possible solutions focusing on dif-
ferent time horizons. In the short run, one can think of stronger financial
incentives for purchasing agencies, or imposing more efficient procedures,
such as auctions, to assign EMEA services to individuals.19 An auction mech-
anism stimulates competition between bidders and allows sellers and buyers
to gain from the service exchange, provided that quality is clearly defined,
contracted and enforced.
In the long run, an option may be that health insurers take over the
responsibilities of the purchasing agencies in contracting with health care
19 Since 2005 for example online auctions on postpartum services are taking place in the
Netherlands via an internet website. This auction takes place between health care insurers and
providers of care. The auction works as follows: The request for postpartum services is placed
on internet and subsequently care providers have seven days at disposal to auction off.
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providers. If health insurers are made to bear all financial risks associated
with carrying out this task, then they will have an incentive to bargain for
a low price, possibly using an auction scheme as outlined above. Moreover,
health insurers operate on a larger regional scale than purchasing agencies.
As a result, health insurers will have a stronger bargaining position. How-
ever, since insurers may appear to be more focused on prices than on quality
in their choice of providers, the issue of quality may arise. It is possible that
the market mechanism will safeguard quality, e.g. if consumers “vote with
their feet” by switching insurers in case of low quality. However it is unclear
whether this mechanism creates a credible threat, since consumers of home
care may not be profitable for health insurers. In principle, a risk equaliza-
tion scheme could be used to address the latter problem, but whether this is
feasible in practice remains an open question.
APPENDIX 1: FUNCTIONS OF LONG-TERM CARE
The long-term health care services that are covered by the EMEA insurance
is currently subdivided in 7 functions of care summarized in Table 4.
TABLE 4 – FUNCTIONS OF CARE
Function of care Description
1. House care Activities related to house keeping, such as cleaning
and tiding up
2. Personal care Activities related to personal care such as help with
showering, dressing up, and help with eating and
drinking
3. Nursing Medical care given to patients, namely injections,
wound care, and drug administration
4. General supervision Activities aimed at enhancing the integration of the
individual into the society, e.g., support to plan daily
activities
5. Activating supervision Activities related to recovering individuals from psy-
chological illnesses, e.g., how to change behavior in
the society
6. Treatments Activities aimed at curing diseases, e.g., revalidation
after a stroke
7. Residency This is residential care, when the patient needs to
be placed in an institution because home care help
would not suffice
Source: Decision on EMEA contracts, 25 October 2002. Besluit zorgaanspraken
AWBZ, 25 oktober 2002, http://www.st-ab.nl/wetawbzorbza.htm.
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